On an Alleged Proof of Atheism: Reply to John Park by Gellman, Jerome
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 6/3 (AUTUMN 2014), PP. 267-274
ON AN ALLEGED PROOF OF ATHEISM: 
REPLY TO JOHN PARK
JEROME GELLMAN
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
In a recent article in this journal1, John Park presents what he takes to be 
a deductive proof that the theistic God does not exist. That is because the 
theistic God is supposed to be omnibenevolent, and Park argues against 
this being so. Since God is not omnibenevolent, concludes Park, the God 
of theism does not exist.
Park summarizes his argument as follows:
Like the logical problem of evil, the moral epistemological argument 
is a  logical contradiction problem for theism. There is a contradiction 
in the fact that God is omnibenevolent, God has the power to provide 
knowledge of good and evil to human beings, and God at times gives 
immoral laws to people. (p. 127)
Park goes on to spell out the argument further, where ‘God’ is shorthand 
for ‘the God of theism’:
God’s omnibenevolence means that he has full knowledge of what is 
objectively right and wrong and that when God provides humans with 
laws and commands, they always should be moral rather than immoral 
ones. Given that God has full knowledge of what is objectively right and 
wrong and that he has the power to perform divine revelation, when he 
does provide humans with moral precepts and orders, they must be moral 
rather than immoral. However, God apparently does not always provide 
human beings with beliefs of objectively virtuous laws and commands. 
At times God seemingly gives people maxims of utter depravity and 
1 John Park, ‘The Moral Epistemological Argument for Atheism’, European Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 7, no. 1 (2015), 121-142.
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wickedness. The contradiction lies in the fact that some of the purported 
moral knowledge that is given to humans by divine revelation is at times 
ethically and objectively wrong. Therefore, the existence of God and the 
existence of the supposed immoral mandates are incompatible with each 
other, where given the immoral mandates, we may conclude that the 
omnibenevolent God really does not exist. Notice that in order to form 
the contradiction, one merely needs only one immoral command from 
God. (p. 127)
For the sake of the discussion, I lay out the main lines of the argument 
as follows:
(1) God is omnibenevolent. (Assumption to be disproven)
(2) If God is omnibenevolent, then if God provides humans with laws 
and commands, they will always be moral. (Premise)
So,
(3) If God provides humans with laws and commands, they will 
always be moral. (1,2,)
However,
(4) At times, God seemingly gives people laws and commands of 
utter depravity and wickedness.
So,
(5) It is not the case that if God provides humans with laws and 
commands they will always be moral. (3,4)
So,
(6) God is not omnibenevolent.
So, (7) the God of theism does not exist.
A few preliminary notes:
 – Although Park is otherwise categorical in asserting that God does 
sometimes give morally depraved commands, in his summation 
Park states only that this is ‘seemingly’ the case. This is unfortunate, 
since there is no logical contradiction between a  proposition p 
and a proposition that states that seemingly not-p. That is because 
seemingly not-p is consistent with the seeming being deceptive 
or otherwise discounted. So, no contradiction results. So, I delete 
‘seemingly’ in (4) in favour of a categorical assertion.
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 – Park apparently intends that God fully knowing right and wrong 
and being able to reveal such are included as part of what he 
means by God being omnibenevolent. Then one could deny 
that God is omnibenevolent by denying any one component of 
omnibenevolence.
Now, premise (1) states the premise to be rejected because it will generate 
a contradiction. (2) states what Park takes, apparently, to be a conceptual 
truth. (3) follows deductively from (1) and (2). Park spends several pages 
to establish premise (4) categorically, without ‘seemingly’. His examples 
of horrid commands are from the Bible. Park cites chapter and verse 
from the Old Testament, in the main, and some from the New Testament. 
Park observes that God allows for slavery and blood vengeance, that God 
commands unjustly the death penalty for a wide number of actions, and 
does not deal well with women. God commands immoral warfare, such 
as the eradication of Amalek, and commands Moses to kill innocent 
people in war, tantamount to ethical cleansing. And so on. Given (4), (5) 
and (6) follow in turn.
Let us look at the overall logic of the argument. Park argues for 
a contradiction between two propositions:
(1) God is omnibenevolent.
And
(4) At times, God gives people laws and commands of utter depravity 
and wickedness.
Now, from the fact alone that two propositions are contradictory it 
follows that one must be false. However, nothing yet follows about which 
of the two is false. As far as the above argument is concerned, one could 
just as well deny (4) as deny (1). And, indeed, there are many people 
who deny (4) in any case. There are those who do not believe in God in 
the first place. Some believe in God but do not give credence to stories 
of the Bible. Marcion and some Gnostics believe that YHVH of the OT 
is not God. People of Eastern religions fail to believe in God or the Bible 
at all. To none of these will Park’s argument constitute a proof for the 
non-existence of God. In fact, Park himself does not believe (4) to be 
true. Altogether, we are talking about a vast number of people. They will 
simply deny (4). No contradiction arises for them.
The situation here is quite different from what it is with the logical 
problem of evil. There the existence of evil is manifest to all, while God’s 
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existence is not. So it makes sense to try to use evil to get a contradiction 
with the existence of God and then to conclude that God does not exist. 
But here that the stories of the Bible depicting YHVH as giving immoral 
commands are true is not manifest to all and easily denied by a great 
proportion of humankind, as it is by Park.
What Park’s argument really does is present an ad hominem dilemma 
for believers in the Bible, who, if Park is right, will be caught in assenting 
to both of the contradictory propositions. That this is the true import of 
the argument is clear from the way Park deflects some of the attempted 
rejoinders to his argument. He can write in response to a suggestion of 
how to get out of his conclusion things like: ‘I take it that most theists will 
not espouse this strategy’ (p. 132). Or ‘The burden of proof falls squarely 
on the theist’ (p. 134). These quotations show that Park is after showing 
a contradiction in the beliefs of most theists, from which, the argument 
would be, it follows that most theists must give up their belief in God. 
This falls short, though, of being a proof of God’s nonexistence, per se.
This way of understanding Park, and I  can think of no better, has 
several problems. As an ad hominem dilemma against a theist, the theist 
could give up either one of the propositions forming the contradiction. 
It need not be the one that says God is omnibenevolent. Indeed, for 
the theist, that God is omnibenevolent might well be more entrenched, 
more foundational, to her thinking than that the Bible truly reports on 
God’s evil decrees. Park has given an ostensible dilemma for the theist, 
but without providing any reason why a theist should reject one specific 
proposition in the contradiction rather than the other.
Secondly, Park misconceives the logic of some of the rebuttals to his 
argument. Park considers a theistic rejoinder that says that passages in 
which God is reported to have given immoral commands are simply not 
to be believed. God never really gave these commands. The passages are 
fabricated or misunderstandings and are not to be taken as revelatory. 
Park objects that the Bible is said to be ‘holy’, which should include all 
passages. So, Park avers, the theist cannot take this tack. But this reply is 
not to the point. Park should accept this rejoinder as showing that one 
could believe in God’s omnibenevolence by denying premise (4). And 
the theist can do so simply by giving up the idea that every single Biblical 
passage truly reports God’s commands and actions. The theist then will 
have to modify only the idea that the Bible being ‘holy’ implies that every 
word is to be affirmed. On what grounds must the theist give up on her 
central belief in God’s omnibenevolence in order to solve the dilemma, 
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rather than make this secondary adjustment about the Bible being ‘holy’? 
Park offers no grounds.
Park further objects to the above rejoinder:
The theist may respond that since God is omnibenevolent, only the 
moral commands are really from God while the immoral ones must 
be fabricated or must be misinterpretations. This is the criterion for 
separating legitimate holy passages from the illegitimate ones.
However, the question at hand is whether the supposed God gave 
immoral commands or not. If one states that the supposed God did not 
do so because he is omnibenevolent, then one has simply begged the 
question at hand.
Park does not tell us just what question is being begged here and until 
he does so his reply is not very helpful. For there does not appear to be 
any question being begged. If the question is whether God gave immoral 
commands, then to say that God could not have done so because God is 
omnibenevolent does not beg any question. It is to give a direct answer 
to the question, and one justified from a theistic point of view. For this 
reply by Park to have plausibility he should explain why any question is 
here being begged.
Park also considers a  theistic rejoinder that he calls an  ‘appeal to 
ignorance’:
God works in mysterious ways, and human beings are ignorant of his 
‘big picture’, purposes and final educational means. One cannot know 
God’s ultimate plan or purpose similar to how a small child cannot fully 
understand her parents’ intentions, but one must be assured that the 
ultimate plan is such that somehow no logical contradiction exists.
Park rejects this rebuttal as follows:
However, the fact that God works in mysterious ways does not 
necessarily mean that no contradiction exists. For, in making such 
a  move, the theist does not take into account that it could equally be 
the case that even though the supposed God works in mysterious ways, 
the apparent contradiction still persists. It does not immediately follow 
from the appeal to ignorance that the contradiction has been eliminated. 
The property of ‘working in mysterious ways’ does not in-and-of-itself 
necessarily lead to the fact that the supposed contradiction must then 
be eradicated. Rather, at this first initial stage of assessing the appeal to 
ignorance and the property ‘working in mysterious ways’: it is equally 
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rational to conclude that there still may be a supposed contradiction or 
there may not be one, and thus, an agnosticism is warranted regarding 
the efficacy of the appeal to ignorance. It is equally rational that God 
works in mysterious ways always towards good or perhaps, on the other 
hand, sometimes towards evil. If the theist then claims that the supposed 
contradiction must be eradicated if God works in mysterious ways 
because the purported God is omnibenevolent, then this is once again 
begging the question.
I take Park’s point to be that:
(8) God works in mysterious ways
does not give us a reason for thinking that the contradiction does not 
exist. That is because (8) is consistent with the truth of (4) and any other 
component of Park’s argument. And that is correct. (8) is consistent 
with God being evil, in whole or in part. God might work in mysterious 
ways and yet be evil. Hence, (8) gives us no reason to think that the 
contradiction does not exist.
However, (8) fails to do justice to the position Park is rejecting. 
Consider the view of Mark Murphy, whom Park cites as an  advocate 
of (8). Regarding the charge of wrongdoing by God in destroying the 
people of Jericho in the OT, Murphy invokes the view of sceptical theism 
to deflect this accusation. Murphy writes:
The sceptical theists have argued against the claim that the existence of 
these worldly evils calls into question the existence of a perfectly good 
God by denying that we have adequate reason to believe that we are well 
positioned to assess whether there are goods that justify the permission 
of those evils ... . There is no reason to suppose that the human being’s 
grasp of intrinsic value and the means of realizing it is sufficient to give 
us justified confidence that God inadequately responded to the intrinsic 
value of the Jerichoites. To take the most obvious point, the destruction 
of the Jerichoites is, so far as we know, part of or the best means to 
an  organic unity that has greater (or not lesser) intrinsic value than 
would be available by leaving Jericho more intact.
Murphy’s argument is that human beings are not in a position to assert 
that when God destroyed the people of Jericho God was doing something 
morally reprehensible. We are not able to make such a judgment, Murphy 
is saying, because we are not in a position to know what God knows and 
plans, and what justifying goods God brings about in the larger picture 
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as a result of the destruction of Jericho. For all we know, God’s action 
against the people of Jericho was well justified from a  moral point of 
view. Applying this argument here, what will be said is that we are not in 
a position to assert
(4) At times, God gives people laws and commands of utter depravity 
and wickedness.
While the laws and commands appear to us to have been wicked, we 
are not in a position to say so. For all we know, God, could have been 
acting in full moral justification when giving those laws. That is because 
God, in God’s immense power and knowledge, could have been acting 
in a good way, given the total, organic picture of reality. Since that is the 
rejoinder, what a  full understanding of (8) is saying is that Park does 
not have a  right to premise (4). Whether (4) is true or not is, on this 
rejoinder, beyond Park’s or anybody else’s ken.
Understood in this full way, contrary to Park, the rejoinder, to be 
successful, need not prove that there is no contradiction between (1) and 
(4). It would be enough to have neutralized (4) as assertible and thereby 
block the deduction from going forward. So, Park’s reply to this rejoinder 
fails. There may be other ways to attack this rejoinder, for example, by 
saying that God’s evil decrees are deontologically evil and cannot be 
overcome consequentially in the long run. However, Park provides no 
convincing reply in his discussion of this rejoinder.
I  suspect that Park might have had in the back of his mind some 
additional premises that he failed to have appear in his argument. If so 
and if these were added, perhaps the problems I have raised would not 
be telling. If my suspicion is true, it would be good for Park, if he can, 
to flesh out his argument in a way that would avoid the problems I have 
raised.
Although Park does not succeed to prove that God is not 
omnibenevolent, there does remain a  question about the issue Park 
raises. One might ask: Why does the OT, inspired by God, depict so 
many apparently cruel and vicious acts and commands of God? God 
should have inspired only books that recorded acts of God that people 
could hope to emulate in their own lives. God should be presented as 
demonstrably and convincingly supremely merciful and gracious, in 
ways with which we earthlings could identify. Even if God’s apparently 
evil acts of the OT were not, for very deep reasons, evil but the epitome 
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of good, they did not have to be written, or should have been but minor 
themes in the OT. Has a loving God truly inspired the OT?
Imagine that an ‘OTe’ had presented God as acting and commanding 
exclusively – or nearly so – in ways that ordinarily if a human person 
acted in those ways they would be exceedingly evil. Then, surely, the 
above-discussed rejoinders would not be attractive to almost any theist. 
That would mean judging God to be omnibenevolent in the face of 
revelation that presents a  radically different picture of God over all or 
it would mean dismissing the OT as a whole, or nearly so, as genuine 
revelation. And if an  ‘OTg’ had presented God exclusively in ways 
that ordinarily if a  human person acted in those ways they would be 
admired as exceedingly good, then the challenge would not arise at all. 
Now imagine OT’s with a  gradual gradation from OTe to OTg on the 
scale of ‘evil’ divine acts versus ‘good’ divine acts as the content of these 
works, respectively. At what point of the proportion of apparently bad 
to good would the balance tip to where the proposed solutions might 
be convincing? No algorithm determines where the tipping point would 
come. Where it comes for a particular person will depend prominently on 
a number of factors, including whether a person believes independently 
that God is omnibenevolent, that the OT really is about God, that God 
inspired the OT, and their judgment about the amount and horrendous 
quality of the apparent divine evil depicted.
So, my question is this: Suppose a theist becomes deeply shocked and 
thoroughly bewildered by what he takes to be the inordinate extent to 
which (on the face of it) massive evil is perpetrated and commanded 
by God in the OT. It is not a matter of his judging the right or wrong of 
an individual law or divine action or even a series of such. To his reflected 
judgment, the OT as a whole is now much closer to OTe than to OTg. The 
balance has lurched strongly in the wrong direction. Could such a theist 
then be warranted in coming to deny that God is omnibenevolent or that 
the OT cannot truly be depicting God?
